Nietzschean Critique of the State: Part 1 of 2

I recently wrote a paper titled "A Nietzschean Critique of the State" for a grad seminar on Nietzsche. I thought it would be worth sharing a somewhat modified and abridged version here. Since it's not a short paper, I'll post it in two parts: one today, and the next part within in the next week. I hope you find this worth reading, and I welcome feedback and criticism.

“A Nietzschean Critique of the State”

Despite a few strained attempts to derive a political philosophy from the work of Nietzsche, it is now widely accepted that he didn’t have one.[1] Some describe him simply as “anti-political.”[2]  Nonetheless, it should not be surprising that Nietzsche did make some significant comments on the nature of the state, much of which is very critical.

              In what follows, I would like to describe a Nietzschean critique of the state. I say “Nietzschean,” as opposed to “Nietzsche’s own,” because in constructing this critique I will be extrapolating a bit beyond his own explicit comments. My method will be to model this Nietzschean critique of the state on Nietzsche’s own actual critique of morality, especially as presented in On the Genealogy of Morality. In particular, there are two components of Nietzsche’s critique of morality that I would like to put to the state. The first is what I will call “demystification.” (I will focus on this first component in this post.) The second is what I will call “Nietzschean evaluation.” (I will focus on this second component in my next post.)

I. Demystification

What is Demystification?

The first component of the Nietzschean critique of the state is what I will call demystification. A rough, but fuller, statement of what I mean by demystify is as follows:

               X is demystified

                    iff

(a)  X is an entity that has what I will call a “mystique,” which means that it tends to have a special kind of status in the minds of many, in virtue of its "higher" nature or properties. 

(b)  X is shown not to have this nature or these properties, and

(c)   X is shown actually to have a “lower” nature or properties.

(This is a simplified version of the analysis I give in the original version) 

Some examples of demystification are as follows. The Wizard of Oz is demystified when he is exposed as a mere man behind a curtain. Christmas is demystified for a child when his older brother tells him that Santa Claus does not exist. A magic show is demystified when the magician’s secrets are found out. And a set of parents are demystified for an adolescent when he discovers that they are mere humans with real weaknesses and moral flaws. This last example is important because it shows that, as I am using “demystify,” the demystified object need not originally to be thought of as supernatural in any sense. Certain kinds of romanticism about natural things will suffice.

Nietzsche’s Demystification of Morality

Significant aspects of Nietzsche’s critique of morality can be understood as serving the purpose of demystification, as I am using the term. While it is not my purpose here to discuss it extensively, it is worth giving a brief account of two approaches that Nietzsche takes in his demystification of morality. The first is Nietzsche’s naturalism. The purpose of this aspect of his critical project is “[t]o translate humanity back into nature” (BGE 230). He sets out to do just this in the Genealogy, by showing that modern moral values can be reductively explained away in terms of human physiology and psychology. More specifically, they are basically the product of the suffering and vengefulness of the weak. Their becoming prevalent in society (i.e., their “victory”) can be explained by Nietzsche’s second approach in his critique of morality, which is historical. Moral values have come to dominate society because a class struggle has lead to a “slave revolt in morality.” The result of this is that the “knightly-aristocratic” values of the ancient Greeks and Romans were supplanted by the Christian ones, those which benefit the weak at the expense of the strong. (See GM I: esp. 10, 14, 16)

Moral values, Nietzsche wants to show us, did not come from on high, but are simply the product of unattractive psychological processes, resentful class warfare, and historical events. He wants to reveal what he takes to be the truth about morality; namely its “harsh, ugly, unpleasant, unchristian, immoral truth” (GM I: 1). In demonstrating that morality is not what we tend to think it is, but is in fact just the opposite, Nietzsche demystifies it.

Nietzschean Demystification of the State

I would argue that Nietzsche can be understood to be bringing about a similar effect for the state. the mystique of the state is evident in the fact that states (or, rather, those acting on its behalf) often perform with impunity certain actions that would hardly be considered justified if performed by your average citizen. And few question this asymmetry in moral standards. Further evidence of the state’s mystique is that it is often thought to be the product of a special voluntary agreement reached by “the people” in order to carry out their “collective will.”

It is pretty clear that Nietzsche was very aware of the state’s mystique. This is evident, for example, in his countless attacks on German nationalism. It can also be seen clearly in a very scathing treatment of the state found in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In the section in question, called “On the New Idol,” Nietzsche’s Zarathustra observes that the state has assumed a god-like status – something to replace the old God, in whom Europeans were beginning to abandon belief.

But this almost-divine status – it’s mystique – is based on deception: “Whatever it tells you, it lies,” Zarathustra says. “This lie crawls out of its mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’” And the state goes even further, declaring: “‘On earth there is nothing greater than I: the ordaining finger of God am I.’” And it legitimizes these claims by surrounding itself with “heroes and honorable men” (Z I.11).

But Nietzsche exposes a truth about the state in the second treatise of his Genealogy. In this essay, Nietzsche explains that the emergence of human civilization not a gradual or organic process, but occurred abruptly and violently: “[T]his change...presented itself...as a break, a leap, a compulsion.” We find “its beginning in an act of force, [it] could be brought to its conclusion only by acts of force.” He goes further:

[T]he oldest “state” accordingly made its appearance as a terrible tyranny, as a crushing and ruthless machinery…I use the word “state”: it goes without saying who is meant by this – some pack of blond beasts of prey, a race of conquerors and lords, which, organized in a warlike manner and with the power to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible paws on a population…It is in this manner, then, that the “state” begins on earth. (GM II. 17)

The state is no creation of “the people.” He continues:

I think the flight of fancy that had it beginning with a ‘contract’ has been abandoned. Whoever can give orders, whoever is ‘lord’ by nature, whoever steps forth violently, in deed and gesture – what does he have to do with contracts! (GM II. 17)

Just as he does with morality, Nietzsche explains the roots of the state by pointing out the “harsh, ugly, unpleasant, unchristian, immoral truth” about it. In the first place, the state's legitimacy is built on deception, using the virtuous with whom it surrounds itself as a façade. In addition, it has awful origins in violence and conquest, and not in any sort of mutually beneficial contractual agreement, as many want to believe. But if one takes seriously what Nietzsche says here about the nature and origin of the state, he is unlikely to be left with such a literal understanding of social contract theory, or romanticized interpretations of slogans such as “we the people.” In other words, the passages discussed above can be said to help remove the mystique from – to demystify – the state.

The Role and Significance of Demystification in Nietzsche’s Critique

Of course, one might suspect that Nietzsche is arguing ad hominem or making the genetic fallacy in all of this. One can certainly point out that, even if modern moral values have unattractive origins and are preached by hypocrites, this is not sufficient to cast a judgment about the value or truth of those values themselves. Modern moral values may be, in some sense, the right ones. The same can be said for the state: even if the state has unattractive origins and is composed of liars and their tools, this is not sufficient to cast a judgment about the justice or value of the institution in itself. The state may be, in at least some of its forms, a necessary and just institution.

But pointing out that Nietzsche is engaging in this kind of fallacious argumentation presupposes that Nietzsche is engaging in argumentation in the first place. And it’s not certain that Nietzsche’s demystification of morality is meant to demonstrate or argue for anything. Its purpose, it has been argued, is rather to prime his reader for the other component of his critique, which is more demonstrative in nature. (As will be seen in the next post.) More specifically, Nietzsche needs his reader to be able to see morality with a more realistic or even skeptical eye, so that this reader will be able to take the rest of Nietzsche’s critique more seriously.[3] I would argue that the same would apply to a Nietzschean critique of the state. Nietzsche’s demystifying comments can be understood as primers, getting the reader ready for the more argumentative or demonstrative component of the critique.

This understanding of Nietzsche’s demystification has a few implications worth mentioning. First, it implies that demystification is less central to the critical project under discussion. While it serves a (perhaps important) preliminary function, the main thrust of the critique lies elsewhere. This leads to the second implication: since Nietzsche’s demystification is not meant to be an argument, he should not be thought of as engaging in fallacious reasoning in offering it. The third implication follows from the fact that Nietzsche’s citations of the violent origins and deception of the state only play a rhetorical role in this less crucial component of his critique, and that his real problem lies elsewhere (as will be demonstrated in the second half of this paper). This suggests that he has no real problem with the violence and deception of the state in themselves. This is important because it means that Nietzsche’s critique should not be misinterpreted as one based on moral principle(s), as is the case, for example, with certain classical liberal critiques based on natural rights or even utility. I will make a few further comments on this point at the end of this paper (in the next post), after describing the more demonstrative component of the Nietzschean critique of the state.

Notes

1. See Brian Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 292 ff, where it is explained that some have tried to interpret Nietzsche as advocating a kind of caste system based on a couple discussions of the Law of Manu, and that this interpretation has been shown to be untenable by Thomas Brobjer, “The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche’s Writings (Nietzsche-Studien 27, 1998) pp. 300 ff.

2. Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routldge, 1991), see chapter 3.

3. See Leiter (2002  p. 179: “[b]y revealing the ‘shameful origin’ of [modern morality] the Genealogy simply brings a ‘feeling of diminution in value of the thing that originated thus and prepares the way to a critical mood and attitude toward it” (second emphasis Leiter’s); see also p. 283.